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Abstract 
 
Despite the steady growth of China’s economic since the economic reforms in 1978, the rural-urban income inequality has also 
risen rapidly. Here we explore the role that rural land reform plays in raising income. We investigate growth in rural household 
income which can be attributed to a Rural Land Registration and Certification (RLRC) program that was put into effect in 
Chengdu city, Sichuan province in 2009. We draw on household socio-economic data collected in 2011 through a purpose 
designed survey for the analysis. Using regression and matching methods, we find that the RLRC program has contributed to 
certified farmers’ participation in land market, especially rental transfer of land to more productive producers. Findings for the 
program’s impact on increasing farmers’ income are mixed. Although transfer income from land rentals and government 
subsidies has greatly increased, farming income and wage income have not significantly improved, suggesting that land 
certification may have had a substitution effect and an income effect on household’s choice between farm, wage employment 
and leisure. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The land that the farmers are allocated is among the few resources that they can use to generate incomes, particularly 
due to limited access to formal sectors employment. Property rights to land are thus one of the most powerful resources 
available to farmers to increase and extend their sustainable livelihoods (FAO, 2002). While there is a lot of research on 
the investment and productivity effects of land tenure (Deininger, Ali, & Alemu, 2011; Dong, 2000; Feder & Onchan, 1987; 
S. Holden, Deininger, & Ghebru, 2009; Place & Otsuka, 2002), very few quantitative studies focus on the welfare impacts 
of land reforms.  
Land in rural China is an asset that farmers have had access to, but the property rights to this land have remained 
with the local community collectively. The issue of such rights has the potential to enrich farmers whilst reducing 
inequality between rural and urban residents. In China, the urban income was about 3.23 times that of the countryside in 
2010, so that China has one of the largest urban-rural gaps (Xin  He, 2011). To address the issues, consecutive No. 1 
policy documents issued by the central government have taken boosting farmers' incomes as the theme (Zhang, 2010). 
For example, the No.1 document in 2008 regulates that a land certification program should be carried out and farmers 
would be allowed to transfer their land use rights based on the new land certification. This rural land reform was expected 
to improve rural living standards and double per capita annual net income by 2020 for China’s 700 million farmers – who 
currently earn 4,760 yuan (less than US$800) a year on average1.  
  By better protecting property rights through land certification program, the reforms could also help reduce the 
social tensions and riots that have resulted from corruption within the present system, with property developers conspiring 
                                                            
1 Data was from National Bureau of Statistics of China 2009, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/. yuan: Chinese unit of currency.  1 USD = 
6.28 yuan, 2013-01-30. 
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with local officials to illegally seize farmland in exchange for little to no compensation. Of the tens of thousands of rural 
protests that occur in China annually, nearly half relate to land grabs (Fan, 2008).  
Chengdu was in the first wave to pilot this rural land reform which entailed issue of property rights to the land. In 
this paper, we investigate the impacts of Rural Land Registration and Certification (RLRC) program on rural household 
income. Section 2 discusses the methodology that will be employed. Section 3 presents the empirical results of the 
analysis, followed by section 4 to draw the conclusion. 
 
2. Methodology  
 
2.1 Study sites and data collection 
 
The purpose of the paper is to study the impact of RLRC program on household income. Thus the survey sample was 
stratified into two groups: (1) Treatment group comprising: households on certified land in Qun’an village, Sichuan 
province, and (2) Control group comprising: households on uncertified land in Xiayong village, Fujian province. Ideally the 
treatment and control villages ought to be identical except for certification but this was not the case as explained below. 
These two sites were selected in consultation with local government officials. Qun’an village was identified as one 
of the pilot areas in Chengdu City where a land reform project was on-going in 2011. At the time of survey, the 
households in Qun’an village had had land certification for about two years. Land issues are sensitive in rural China and it 
proved impossible to find an uncertified village in Sichuan: officials refused to disclose the list of uncertified areas, 
describing it as an “internal confidential file”. After exhausting all other options, I chose solely for convenience my 
hometown. Both the villages are located within the main rice producing regions in their counties in south China, and some 
50 kilometres via paved road to the main market. As to the uncertified village (Xiayong), although it is located in a 
mountainous area, the farmers grow crops mainly on the flat plots. All these similarities make the uncertified village a 
suitable comparison group to the certified village. 
With the referral letters from official departments in the counties, I made appointments with the village heads to set 
up times for the survey. In addition to budget and time constraints, the fact that many household heads work outside 
villages after the rice harvest made random sampling difficult. The village heads arranged the production team leaders to 
assist the survey through: (1) recruiting as many household heads as possible to do the questionnaires; and (2) guiding 
us to visit household heads house by house. All the interviewees were informed of the purpose of the survey and their 
written consent was sought before the interview.2  
Data was collected in November 2011, about two months after the rice harvest. The questions focussed on 
information relating to the socioeconomic characteristics of households; the output of rice; the use of purchased inputs 
and labour; the tenure status of the land; and household income sources. Data were therefore cross-sectional with 
responses from 140 households, including 73 from Qun’an village (certified) and 67 from Xiayong village (uncertified). 
Respondents were usually the household heads except when they were absent, in which case they were mainly replaced 
by their spouses or other adult household members. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
 
Research shows that land certification has enhanced tenure security and stimulated land rental market participation 
(Deininger, et al., 2011; Gine, 2005; Holden, Deininger, & Ghebru, 2011). Therefore, the titled farmers lacking 
comparative advantage in agriculture can lease their land to others, take up non-agricultural employment or invest in a 
business as a source of off-farm income (Chand & Yala, 2009; de Janvry, Gordillo, Platteau, & Sadoulet, 2001).   
In terms of the relationship between land tenure security and household income, López (1996) cited in Holden 
(2011)) found a positive return, net of the cost of titling, to household income from land registration and titling in 
Honduras. Moreover, positive impacts of land registration and titling on both income and land values have been found in 
Thailand (Feder & Nishio, 1998). In Nicaragua, receipt of registered title increases land values by 30% (Deininger & 
Chamorro, 2002). Since the rural land registration program has just started in China, there is a void in terms of empirical 
research on the welfare effects of land titling. 
In rural China, farmers have three main sources of income: farm income, wage income, and transfer income.  
                                                            
2 The survey was conducted as stipulated in the UNSW ethics approval for this research. 
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1. Farm income: comprises the potential market value of crops and the sale of livestock. In order to encourage 
farmers to grow more grains and boost production, since 2004, the central government has set minimum 
procurement prices for grain, including rice and wheat to buy grains from farmers (ChinaDaily, 2013). At the 
time of survey, the minimum procurement prices for rice and wheat were 1.2 yuan/jin 3  and 1 yuan/jin, 
respectively.  
2. Wage income: includes wages received from employment outside of agriculture plus income from self-
employment (entrepreneurship). 
3. Transfer income consists of rental income from the land being leased out and government subsidies, such as 
Cultivated Land Protection Fund (CLPF), available only in Chengdu city.  
4. Other income: for example, remittances from children and pension insurance.  
In June 2007, Chengdu city was licensed by the state to proceed with a land reform pilot project that would allow 
farmers to lease out and mortgage their land. The RLRC program was the first step of the reform. The goal of RLRC was 
to address the problems of land tenure insecurity, establish an effective land market and thus narrow the income gap 
between urban and rural residents (Zhou, 2011). The key features of this experiment are: first, that being granted with 
formal land certificates, farmers can transfer their land to more productive farmers or to private agricultural companies; 
and second, they can also be employed in these agricultural companies and share the bonuses from increased output.  
Besides, to encourage farmers to protect the cultivated land from being converted to non-farm uses, Cultivated 
Land Protection Fund (CLPF) was given out by the Chengdu government. It should be noted that CLPF was unique to 
Chengdu City. It was derived from the land transaction revenue of the Chengdu municipal government. To be eligible for 
the CLPF payment, the land had to be under cultivation. CLPF payment amounted to 360 yuan per mu4 per year for basic 
farmland (to grow field crops such as grain, cotton, oil, and vegetables) and 270 yuan per mu per year for general 
farmland (used for cash crops like flowers, herbs, etc). In addition, farmers could receive direct subsidy for growing grain 
which was 60-90 yuan per mu. Therefore, farmers in the certified village could receive up to 450 yuan per mu subsidy 
from the government. Farmers in the uncertified village, however, do not receive CLPF payments or anything similar. The 
grain subsidy in the uncertified village was only for households who grew grain over 15 mu. 
Household incomes were calculated for the 12 months preceding the survey without deducting costs such as farm 
inputs and daily expenses. As most of these farmers are producing crops primarily for household consumption, if these 
costs were deducted, their net incomes would be close to zero, as the interviewees complained.  
Five hypotheses are to be tested in this paper based on the fieldwork data: 
H1: The RLRC program enables certified farmers to participate more in land rental market; 
H2: By leasing in land, farms may achieve economies of scale, and therefore obtain higher farm income; 
H3: Being freed from land by leasing out farm plots, farmers are able to devote themselves to non-agricultural 
activities, thus raising their wage income; 
H4: The RLRC program helps to increase total household income; 
H5: The RLRC program helps to improve the living conditions and quality of life of rural households by increasing 
per capita income. 
 
2.3 Estimating treatment effects 
 
To estimate the impact of the RLRC program on the household income, the households’ likelihood of participation 
in land rental market is firstly estimated through a linear probability model (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 253): 
ሺ ൌ ͳȁሻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܦ ൅ ߙଶܺ ൅ ߝ                             [1] 
where R is the dummy that is equal to 1 if household is participating in land rental market either through leasing in 
or leasing out some land, and 0 otherwise. D represents the land tenure status (1-certified, 0-uncertified). X is a vector of 
household/land variables.  Į1, Į2 are the parameters of interest, and capture the partial effects of the variables on the 
farmer’s land market participation.  
The impacts of land certification program on income sources are estimated through both ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression and propensity score matching methods, which are two basic methods for adjusting estimates of causal 
effects. The goal of both methods is to construct comparison of treated and control units that are balanced in household 
                                                            
3  jin: Chinese unit of weight, 1 kg = 2 jin. 
4 mu: Chinese unit of area, 1 hectare=15 mu. 
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socioeconomic covariates except for land tenure status. 
 
2.3.1 OLS regression model 
 
The parameters estimated by the OLS model are based on Cobb-Douglas function:  
 ܫ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܦ ൅ σߚଶ ܺ ൅ ݑ                                       [2] 
where I denotes the income categories: farm income, wage income, transfer income, total household income, and 
per capita income. ȕ1 captures the tenure effect on income sources, which is the average treatment effect over all 
observations. ȕ2 represents the impact of household variables on household income. 
 
2.3.2 Matching model 
 
The goal of matching is to measure the causal effect of a binary (0-1) treatment or policy on the average outcome 
variable, i.e. average treatment effects (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 458). The two mostly studied average causal effects in the 
treatment effects context are the average treatment effects over all observations (ATE), and the average treatment 
effects on the treated (ATT). By conditioning on observed covariates, X, the two treatment effects can be estimated by 
(Sekhon, 2011): 
ATE = E (Yi1|Di = 1) – E (Yi0|Di = 0)                                         [3] 
ATT = E (Yi1|Di = 1) – E (Yi0|Di = 1)                                         [4] 
Equation 4 cannot be directly estimated because the outcome of certified households if they had not participated in 
the RLRC program i.e., E (Yi0|Di = 1)), is not observed for the treated. Therefore, the matching methods involve the 
construction of counterfactual expectations of the dependent variable, i.e., constructing estimates of E (Yi0|Di=1) for the 
mean outcome of certified households if they had not participated in the RLRC program. ATT is then actually estimated 
by averaging over the observed outcome values of Y for households that are similar on the covariates X: 
ATT = E {E (Yi | Xi, Di = 1) – E (Yi | Xi, Di = 0) | Di = 1}                     [5] 
where the right-hand side is the estimate of the ATE adjusted for the conditional treatment effect among the 
distribution of covariates X in the treated group (Sekhon, 2011). If causal effects are constant over each observation, then 
the ATE and ATT are identical (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007). 
The matching estimators based on propensity score are widely used to estimate treatment effects. Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) defined the propensity score as the conditional probability of assignment to a treatment given a vector 
of covariates X including the values of all treatment confounders:  
P (X) = Pr (D = 1|X)                                                    [6] 
After running a probit of household characteristics on tenure status, a propensity score is obtained for each 
household. This score is the predicted probability of being treated (whether or not actually treated), allowing households 
to be matched using this score that represents observable characteristics of the household. A better procedure of after-
matching analysis is to use the same parametric analysis as have been used to analyze the original raw data set without 
pre-processing (Ho, et al., 2007). Therefore, least square estimates were chosen in matching model. 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
3.1 Data description 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of statistics on the variables for which data was collected from the two villages, as well as 
test statistics on the equality of means between the villages. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Survey Sample 
 
Variables Total Qun’an(certified) 
Xiayong 
(uncertified) 
Difference: 
t test (p value) 
Characteristics of household head and the household
Age 53.12 53.16 53.07 -0.05(0.95) 
Gender 0.94 0.91 0.97 1.35(0.17) 
Education 2.38 2.48 2.27 -1.86(0.06) · 
Household size 4.38 4.27 4.50 0.75(0.45) 
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Number of adults (14<age<65) 3.53 3.15 3.95 3.32(0.001)*** 
Number of migrant workers 2.23 1.91 2.58 3.01(0.003)** 
Characteristics of land  
Hold a new land certification 0.52 1 0 -- 
Land area (mu) 4.16 4.48 3.81 -2.20(0.03) * 
Participation in land transfer: 0.47 0.78 0.13 -10.04(0.000)*** 
Lease in 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.16(0.86) 
Lease out 0.40 0.75 0.02 -13.16(0.000)*** 
Income sources (yuan)
Farm income 6,123 6,925 5,250 -0.40(0.68) 
Wage income 25,624 24,514 26,833 0.47(0.63) 
Transfer income 1,898 3,640 0 -11.62(0.000)*** 
Rent income 1135 2,177 0 -7.33(0.000)*** 
Subsidy 763 1,463 0 -14.61(0.000)*** 
Other income 125 184 60 -1.46(0.14) 
Total income 33,766 35,256 32,143 -0.50(0.61) 
Per capita income 8,190 9,031 7,273 -0.82(0.41) 
Observations 140 73 67  
Significance code: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05 *, 0.10·    
 
Source: Author’s Survey in 2011.  
 
There are not significant differences between villages in terms of the household head’s age (average 53 years) and 
gender (over 90% male), and the household size (average 4 members). However, the uncertified village averages nearly 
1 additional adult and 1 extra migrant worker. 
Although the average education level in both villages is at the “primary school” level, the average is higher in the 
certified village; this difference is statistically significant at 10% level. The mean land area per household is 4.48 mu in the 
certified village and 3.81 mu in the uncertified. In both villages, land area per capita ranged from 0.7 to 1.3 mu.  
As to income variables, the average household has a total income of around 34,000 yuan per year, composed of 
farm income (18%), wage income (76%), and transfer income (6%). In both villages, wage income is clearly more 
important as a source of income than the other two sources. The two study sites differ in transfer income. Some 78% of 
the certified households engage in land transfer activities: 96% of these lease the land out to others. Farmers in Qun’an 
village receive transfers amounting to 3,640 yuan per household. Farmers in the uncertified village, however, rarely lease 
their land. Of the 67 households in Xiayong, only 9 (13%) participate in land transfers: 7 lease in land for a rent (100-390 
yuan per year per mu), and the other 2 allow their relatives to farm the land without charge. Therefore, the average 
transfer income of the uncertified households is 0. 
 
3.2 Econometric results 
 
3.2.1 Effect of land certification on land market participation 
 
Table 2 tests Hypothesis 1 based on a probit regression model. The clear result is that the land certification program has 
a positive and significant (at 0.1% level) impact on household participation in land transfer activities, especially leasing 
out the land. Hypothesis 1 is therefore strongly supported.  
 
Table 2. Probability of Participating in Land Market (n=140) 
 
Variables Participation in land leasing (in or out) Lease-out Lease-in 
(Intercept) -0.593 (1.340) -2.672 (1.474) · 1.016 (1.694) 
Hold a new land certification 1.502 (0.298)*** 2.477 (0.414)*** -0.617 (0.404) 
Age -0.013 (0.015) -0.021 (0.017) -0.008 (0.019) 
Gender 0.020 (0.614) 0.911 (0.627) -0.631 (0.578) 
Education 0.033 (0.209) 0.168 (0.234) -0.110 (0.284) 
Household size -0.095 (0.166) -0.029 (0.187) -0.228 (0.238) 
Number of adults -0.270 (0.195) -0.158 (0.220) 0.032 (0.246) 
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(14<age<65) 
Number of migrant workers -0.018 (0.159) -0.015 (0.188) -0.442 (0.210) * 
Land area (mu) 0.423 (0.154)** 0.351 (0.163)* 0.239 (0.177) 
AIC 135.73 102.63 96.28 
Significance code: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05 *, 0.10· 
 
Source: Author’s Survey in 2011.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
   
The number of migrant workers is statistically significant at 5% level and with a negative sign. If more household 
members work outside the village, fewer are available to work on the farm and it is less possible for the household to 
lease in land. 
The land area held by households has a positive and significant effect on land market participation, particularly 
leasing out of land. As the survey data shows, only 75% of the total land area in the sample was used to grow rice. 
Therefore, households with a larger land area may have extra land to lease out. 
 
3.2.2 OLS regression estimates 
 
The treatment effects were firstly estimated with the OLS regression model. Table 3 provides the regression results for all 
the five outcome variables.  
 
3.2.2.1 Land tenure status and incomes 
 
As Table 3 shows, holding a new certification significantly improves transfer income because of the rental income and the 
CLPF given out in the certified village. In the certified village, transfer income contributes up to 10% of the total household 
income.  
However, secure land tenure does not have a discernible impact on other income sources. There could be two 
explanations for this result:  
1. Reinforcing property rights of the farmers by land certification program, together with the matching support of 
the village leaders’ efforts to attract investment, has a substitution effect which boosts farmers’ participation in 
land transferring activities instead of farming or being employed. This can be confirmed by the probit results. In 
return, households obtain rental income which is determined by the lessees’ performance in the current year. 
This rental income raises welfare since farmers save on effort they might otherwise expend on farming or 
working in non-farm activities. The results from column 4 and 5 support the conjecture that leasing is 
contributing to household income. 
2. An income effect may exist if a household receives transfer income which is large enough to discourage them 
from using effort to farm or take up wage employment in the cities. The income effect could increase the 
household’s demand for leisure. 
Land tenure status can only raise a household’s transfer income on the condition that the household can transfer 
the land to more productive farmers or private agricultural businesses. This will largely depend on the plot location, and 
most importantly, the village committee’s ability to attract investments in agricultural business.  
While conducting the survey, we learnt that those farmers who do not lease out their land, which is largely due to a 
limited land market, continue to farm to supplement their income, even when they do not obtain a corresponding return 
from land compared to their labour input and other farm-related inputs. The high living costs and instability of employment 
opportunities in urban areas compels them to cultivate. For them, farming is like having insurance against the volatile 
wage income from urban cities. For farmers who leased out their land, especially those who leased out all of their land, 
the problem is how to make sure they obtain the transfer income in time. In some villages in Chengdu city, it is not 
unusual for private enterprises to quit in the middle of contracts without paying rent to farmers (Han, 2009). In the village 
surveyed, 11 households had not received rent because of the poor performance of the plantations. 
The contribution of land certification to incomes could also be constrained by the short time lapse between the time 
when land certificates were issued and when the survey was conducted. The RLRC program had been in effect in Qun’an 
village for just about 2 years at the time of survey, thus the insignificance of tenure dummy on non-transfer incomes may 
be due to the limited time for the effect of tenure on income to materialize.  
 
 
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
                                     Vol 2 No 8 
                              October 2013 
 
 356
Table 3. Regression Results for Household Incomes (n=140) 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
 Farmincome 
Wage
income 
Transfer
income 
Total
income 
Per capita 
income 
(Intercept) 11474.825 (0.169) 
-37410.234
(-0.559) 
-4169.364
(-0.948) 
-30943.936
(-0.324) 
9991.372 
(0.281) 
tenure 1225.512 (0.178) 1199.047(0.177) 
1667.792 
(3.749)*** 
4097.744
(0.425) 
666.670 
(0.185) 
age -602.701(-0.243) 
782.283
(0.320) 
102.210
(0.636) 
295.263
(0.085) 
-347.513 
(-0.267) 
age^2 6.382 (0.270) -3.391(-0.146) 
-0.749
(-0.491) 
2.255
(0.068) 
4.325 
(0.350) 
gender 7094.886 (0.742) 
-12762.885
(-1.357) 
-101.126
(-0.164) 
-5562.618
(-0.415) 
1687.803 
(0.337) 
education -1215.923(-0.326) 
3013.774
(0.823) 
157.851
(0.655) 
2046.300
(0.392) 
-15.721 
(-0.008) 
household size -916.470(-0.306) 
2587.731
(0.879) 
-539.301
(-2.787) ** 
1128.256
(0.269) 
-1595.240 
(-1.019) 
adults 3603.839 (0.979) -771.580(-0.213) 
125.963
(0.529) 
2926.440
(0.567) 
1981.128 
(1.028) 
migrant 
labourers 
-1645.090
(-0.652) 
11052.784 
(4.452)*** 
110.986
(0.680) 
9581.347 
(2.706)** 
1405.178 
(1.064) 
land area -1491.172(-0.668) 
290.143
(0.132) 
606.862
(4.202) *** 
-671.582
(-0.214) 
-1046.650 
(-0.896) 
lease in land 27055.866 (3.650)*** 
-2621.967
(-0.360) 
-780.607
(-1.629) 
23771.117
(2.286) * 
11091.726 
(2.859)** 
lease out land 5119.819 (0.755) 3245.958(0.487) 
2198.608 
(5.014)*** 
10799.045
(1.135) 
5522.496 
(1.556) 
R2 0.12 0.37 0.66 0.21 0.10 
Values of t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
Significance code: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05 *, 0.1· 
 
Source: Authors’ Survey in 2011.   
   
3.2.2.2 Non-farm employment and household income 
 
Non-farm employment has strongly demonstrated its importance in improving household income. As is shown in Table 1, 
over 60% of the adults in both villages work in non-agricultural sectors out of the village; the proportion of total household 
income derived from wage income accounts for 70% in the certified village, and 83% in the uncertified.  
The impacts of the number of migrant labourers on wage income and total income are positive and significant (see 
Table 3). With one more migrant labourer employed in the non-agricultural sector, the household’s annual wage income 
would increase by 11,052 yuan, and total income rises 9,581 yuan. All these indicate the increasing importance of wages 
in household income growth. 
 
3.2.2.3 Land market participation and incomes 
 
Participation in the land rental market has manifested its importance in raising household income. Households who 
leased out land may gain 2,198 yuan more transfer income than those who did not. 
Compared to households who did not lease in land, households that did so achieved 27,055 yuan more farm 
income, 23,771 yuan more total household income and 11,091 yuan more per capita income. This may be due to the fact 
that land was transferred to more productive farmers and economy of scale was reached. The above evidence supports 
Hypothesis 2.  
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3.2.2.4 Other determinants of income variables 
 
The positive and significant effect of land area on transfer income is plausible since a title (certificate) allows the 
household to receive transfer income in proportion to the size of their holding.  
Household size has a statistically significant and negative impact on transfer income per household. For extra 
member, a household would receive 539 yuan less transfer income. The reason that larger household size does not help 
to obtain more transfer income may be that transfer income was given out according to land area rather than household 
size.  
 
3.2.3 Matching estimates 
 
The matching model gives the bias-adjusted estimates that correct the within-match mean differences in the outcome 
variables.  
One of the most common and easiest matching algorithms to implement is k: 1 nearest neighbour matching 
(Rubin, 1973). It matches control individuals to the treated group and discards controls that are not selected as matches. 
Since there are fewer control individuals (67) comparable to the treated individuals (73) in the sample, the matching 
method is implemented with replacement (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002), which means control individual can be used as 
matches for more than one treated individual.  
 
Table 4. Matching Estimates of Treatment Effects of RLRC Program on Household Income  
 
Income sources Matching OLS ATT ATE
 
Farm income 2918.1 (0.29) 1331.9 (0.24) 1225.51 (0.17) 
Wage income 5991.6 (0.53) 5837.8 (0.73) 1199.04 (0.17) 
Transfer income 3639.7 (4.79)*** 2679.7 (5.57)*** 1667.79 (3.74)*** 
Total income 12721 (0.88) 10001 (1.05) 4097.74 (0.42) 
Per capita income 4218.9 (0.82) 1977.7 (0.67) 666.67 (0.18) 
Note: Results are estimated by R software. Matching based on 5:1 with replacement achieved better improvement and higher 
common support compared to k=1… 4.  So we chose 5:1 nearest neighbour matching. 
Significance code: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05 *, 0.1· 
 
Source: Author’s Survey in 2011. Numbers in parentheses are t ratios. 
   
The OLS regression from Table 3 is also provided as a benchmark in Table 4. The models of matching yield similar 
patterns of statistical significance to the OLS estimates. Both methods agree that the land certification program has 
significantly increased households’ transfer income only.  
Overall, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) exceeds the average treatment effect over all 
observations (ATE), and both are larger than the OLS estimates, which represents an estimate of the ATE. As can be 
seen, after discarding the unmatched data, the causal effects become stronger than those in the regression model. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate two main points: land certification encourages farmers to participate in land 
market and improves household incomes. 
The impact of land tenure security on land market participation has been confirmed: the land certification program 
encourages farmers to engage more in land transferring activities, especially leasing out land to plantations or more 
productive farmers.  
However, the average household income or per capita income on certified plots was no greater than that on the 
uncertified. Reasons for this include the fact that land certification may have a substitution effect and an income effect: if 
households engage in the land market to earn rental income, as confirmed above, they may save on the effort they 
otherwise would have expended on farming or working in non-farm activities; if the cash transfer plus land rentals are 
large enough, the farmers may rely on this source of income and enjoy more leisure. 
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In addition, leasing in land for farming contributes significantly to raising the total income and per capita income of 
the households. This supports the proposition that farmers are using the farmland more efficiently, and that benefits of 
economies of scale are being realised. Those who had comparative advantages in farming tend to lease in land, while 
those who had comparative advantages in off-farm employment tend to lease out land. 
Two policy implications can be drawn from these findings.  
1. Wage income from migrant workers is the main source of income for rural households. Therefore, lowering the 
risk of wage employment would encourage more workers to move to the formal sector, improve rural 
household income, and at the same time release more land for large-scale agriculture. 
The challenge for policymakers is to attract investors and industries to their cities that provide more job 
opportunities with greater income security, and thus absorb the surplus rural labour. Therefore, security of 
tenure has to be complemented with security of wage income if farm consolidation is to take place on a larger 
scale.  
2. The effect of tenure security on household income is not significant except for transfer income. However, 
subsidies in the form of transfer income from the government and income derived from land rent cannot be a 
permanent solution. Some commentators warn that farmers could lose their land once they were allowed to 
lease it out and thus in the process lose the guarantee of their livelihood (Xuefeng He, 2010). Thus income 
security and livelihood opportunities remain a challenge for the foreseeable future. Consequently, the 
introduction of the RLRC program in other places must be closely scrutinized for all its effects before it is 
expanded to the rest of the country.  
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